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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether Mr. Malquist's Petition for a Writ of

Certiorari should be denied on the grounds that the
administrative law judge's finding of no medical causation is
supported by substantial evidence; and
2.

Whether Mr. Malquist's Petition for a Writ of

Certiorari should be denied because Allen v. Industrial
Commission did not require the administrative law judge to
utilize the services of a medical panel.
OPINION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
In his Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Dale Malquist
asks this Court to review the Utah Court of Appeals Memorandum
Decision filed in Case No. 910181-CA on November 13, 1991.
the Memorandum Decision attached hereto as Addendum M A. M )

(See
Mr.

Malquist's Petition for Rehearing was denied December 6, 1991.

JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
Mr. Malquist invokes this Court's jurisdiction pursuant
to Rule 46(b) and Rule 46(c) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.

The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this

case pursuant to Article VIII Section 5 of the Utah Constitution,
and Utah Code Annotated §§ 78-2-2(3)(a) and 78-2-2(5) (1989).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Annotated § 63-46b-16(4)(g) (1988) governs
this case and reads as follows:
The appellate court shall grant relief only
if, on the basis of the agency's record, it
determines that a person seeking judicial
review has been substantially prejudiced by
any of the following:
.

.

.

(g) The agency action is based
upon a determination of fact, made
or implied by the agency, that is
not
supported
by
substantial
evidence when viewed in light of the
whole record before the court. . .
Additionally, Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-77 (1953 as amended) may be
controlling.

(The full text of this statute is attached hereto

as Addendum "F.,f)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case and Proceedings Below,

This case involves a disputed workers' compensation
claim.

Mr. Malquist maintains that in April and May of 1985 he

sustained a compensable, on-the-job injury because of knee
problems he allegedly incurred while working for defendant L. K.
Comstock.
2

After a hearing on Mr. Malquist's claim, Administrative
Law Judge Janet Moffitt ruled that the claim must be denied,
because there was no showing of medical causation linking the
applicant's knee problems to his employment with the defendants.
(See Judge Moffitt's Order attached as Addendum

lf

B.M) Mr.

Malquist filed a Motion for Review and requested that the Utah
Industrial Commission reverse the administrative law judge's
factual determination regarding medical causation.

After

reviewing the case, the Industrial Commission denied Mr.
Malquist's Motion for Review and affirmed the administrative law
judge's order.
as Addendum

(See the Industrial Commission's Order attached

,,

C.M)

Mr. Malquist then appealed the Industrial Commission's
ruling.

On November 13, 1991, the Utah Court of Appeals filed a

Memorandum Decision summarily rejecting Mr. Malquist's appeal.
The Utah Court of Appeals subsequently denied Mr. Malquist's
Petition for Rehearing on December 6, 1991.

(See the Order

Denying Petition for Rehearing attached as Addendum "D.")
B.

Statement of Facts.

Petitioner Dale H. Malquist worked for L.K. Comstock as
a welder in April and May of 1985.

(R. 470.)l

To accomplish

certain welding tasks, Mr. Malquist would occasionally have to
kneel.

(R. 482, 491.)

Knee pads were readily available to all

employees, but Mr. Malquist chose not to wear them.

(R. 71, 482,

*The designation "R. 470" is a citation to the Utah Court of
Appeals' Record on Appeal, page 470. This citation device will be
used for all references to the record.
3

492, 523-24.)

As a result of his welding activities,

Mr. Malquist seeks permanent partial disability compensation from
respondents, L.K. Comstock, Wausau Insurance Companies and the
Employers' Insurance Fund.

(R. 1-9.)

After Mr. Malquist quit his job in May 1985, he was
sent to Federal prison in Lampoc, California.

(R. 216, 479.)

Upon his release in 1987, Mr. Malquist worked as an electrician
in Missoula, Montana.

(R. 217-18, 500.)

That job resulted in an

unrelated industrial accident to Mr. Malquist's low back and
shoulder; it is believed that he is currently pursuing civil and
workers' compensation lawsuits in Montana.

(R. 218-20, 500-01.)

At the Industrial Commission hearing held in front of
Administrative Law Judge Moffitt on July 2, 1990, Mr. Malquist
testified under oath that, prior to the alleged injury in 1985,
he only had one prior incident of right knee pain.

(R. 502-03.)

On cross-examination, medical records were introduced showing
that Mr. Malquist had previously suffered from lower extremity
cramping, pain and vascular irregularities since at least 1962.
(R. 504-06.) Furthermore, medical records in 1984 show that
Mr. Malquist's knee problems were bilateral and had begun in 1979
while he was working on the Minuteman Missile Project in Montana.
(R. 396, 507-08.)
In a letter dated October 27, 1987, Mr. Malquist asked
his treating physician to submit a report to his Montana workers'
compensation carrier indicating that his knee problems were the
result of his employment on the Minuteman Missile Project in
1979.

(R. 104, 398.) (Mr. Malquist's correspondence dated
4

October 27, 1987, is attached hereto as Addendum

f,

E.lf)

In that

correspondence, Mr. Malquist overtly contradicts his current
claim by stating that his ongoing knee problems are the direct
result of his job at the Minuteman Missile Project in 1979. (Id.)
At the Industrial Commission hearing, Mr. Malquist
introduced several Affidavits.

Exhibit "A-3" (R. 70) from

Thomas R. Blaeske stated that two years after the alleged injury
while working in Montana, Mr. Malquist:
was complaining of pain in his knees, and by
the end of the day, his knees were swollen
and he was having trouble walking. Even the
next day he would have problems. Sometimes
the swelling would be so bad that I would
have to drive him to and from work. (R. 70.)
Note that Mr. Blaeske's Affidavit describes Mr. Malquist's knee
condition over two years after the alleged industrial accident.
Similarly, the Affidavit of Arny Brown (Exhibit "A-l") indicates
that Mr. Malquist was having knee problems in 1987.
Finally, the Affidavit of Scott Gossard (Exhibit

(R. 69.)

,,

A-2") states

that knee protection was always available in 1985 while
Mr. Malquist was working for L.K. Comstock.

(R. 71.)

In denying Mr. Malquist's claim, Administrative Law
Judge Janet Moffitt found no medical connection between
Mr. Malquist's current knee complaints and the alleged industrial
injury.

(R. 105-08.)

Judge Moffitt also specifically found that

Mr. Malquist's recollection of the source of his knee problems
was not credible.

(Id.)

(Judge Moffitt's Findings of Fact,

Conclusions of Law and Order are attached hereto as Addendum
"B.")

5

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Mr. Malquist contends that his Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari should be granted pursuant to Rule 46(b) and/or Rule
46(c) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
is meritless.

This contention

The Utah Court of Appeals' affirmance of the

Industrial Commission's Order denying workers' compensation
benefits is based on sound, well-settled legal principles.
Because the Court of Appeals has properly applied the appropriate
legal standards in reaching its decision, Mr. Malquist's Petition
should be denied.
Mr. Malquist bases his Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari on the erroneous contention that an Industrial
Commission administrative law judge must submit every disputed
industrial claim to a medical panel before the administrative law
judge can enter his or her Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Order.

Mr. Malquist misconstrues the roles of the

administrative law judge and the medical panel.

Under Utah law,

an administrative law judge is the statutorily appointed finder
of fact presiding over Industrial Commission hearings.

If the

administrative law judge, as fact finder, determines that there
is insufficient medical evidence to support an applicant's claim,
the judge has no obligation to submit the insufficient evidence
to a medical panel.
A medical panel is relied upon by an administrative law
judge when a conflict in the parties' medical evidence raises a
causation issue which the judge cannot resolve without the
panel's expert, impartial assistance.
6

However, when the medical

evidence is singularly one-sided (as in the present case), the
administrative law judge has no obligation to obtain the
assistance of a medical panel prior to entering a Finding of Fact
and Order.
As the following argument and review of the evidence
demonstrates, Administrative Law Judge Janet Moffitt properly
dismissed Mr. Malquist's claim.

The judge had no obligation to

submit any causation issue to the medical panel, because all
competent medical evidence contained in the record points to one
inescapable conclusion:

Mr. Malquist's knee condition is not

medically attributable to his employment with respondent L. K.
Comstock.

That finding of fact was based upon substantial

medical evidence contained in the record.

Additionally, the

Commission's factual finding is bolstered by Mr. Malquist's
untruthful testimony which directly conflicted with the
objective, documentary medical evidence presented at the hearing.
Because no credible, conflicting medical evidence exists, the
administrative law judge's medical causation ruling is beyond
reproach.

Even if there is some minor conflict in the medical

evidence, the Industrial Commission's factual finding on
causation should be sustained because it is supported by
substantial evidence.

7

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE'S FINDINGS OF
NO MEDICAL CAUSATION AND LACK OF CREDIBILITY
ARE AMPLY SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD
Mr. Malquist contends that the Industrial Commission
erred in affirming Administrative Law Judge Janet Moffitt's
finding of no medical causation.

Mr. Malquist suggests that

Judge Moffitt and the Industrial Commission based their decision
upon "serious misconstructions of the testimony and evidence",
thereby rendering the denial of worker's compensation benefits
"arbitrary and capricious."

(See Mr. Malquist's Utah Court of

Appeals Brief at pp. 4 and 10.)

Given the nature of the error

alleged by Mr. Malquist, resolution of this case involves a
straightforward review of the administrative law judge's factual
determination on causation.
In conducting this review, the Utah Supreme Court
affords significant deference to the Industrial Commission's
final order:
Our scope of review of factual findings
in Industrial Commission cases is limited. .
. .
The reviewing court's inquiry is
whether the Commission's findings are
"arbitrary and capricious" or "wholly without
cause" or contrary to the "one finevitable]
conclusion from the evidence" or without "any
substantial evidence" to support them. Only
then should the Commission's findings be
displaced. (Emphasis added.)
Lancaster v. Gilbert Development, 736 P.2d 237, 238 (Utah 1987)
(citations omitted).

8

In Lancaster, the administrative law judge concluded
that medical causation was lacking despite the existence of
substantial conflicting medical evidence.
240.

Lancaster, 736 P.2d at

On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court held that "it is the

responsibility of the administrative law judge to resolve factual
conflicts" regarding medical causation.

Id. at 241. As in

Lancaster. the administrative law judge in the present case found
medical causation to be lacking.

Accordingly, Lancaster will

govern Mr. Malquist's certiorari petition and will result in
affirmance of the Commission's final order, particularly since
the present case (unlike Lancaster) involves no credible
conflicting medical evidence.
Additionally, because Mr. Malquist/s Application for
Hearing was filed after July 1, 1988, the Utah Administrative
Procedures Act ("UAPA") applies to this case.
S 63-46b-22(l) (Repl. 1989).

Utah Code Ann.

In Grace Drilling v. Board of

Review. 776 P.2d 63 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), the Utah Court of
Appeals interpreted the UAPA and held that an agency's finding of
fact will be affirmed unless the finding is not "'supported by
substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record
before the court.'"2
16(4)(g) (1988)).

Id. at 67 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-

Importantly, writing for a unanimous panel,

Judge Billings stated:

2

This Court has stated that "'substantial evidence' is that
quantum and quality of relevant evidence that is adequate to
convince a reasonable mind to support a conclusion." First Nat'l
Bank v. County Bd. of Equalization. 799 P.2d 1163, 1165 (Utah
1990).
9

In undertaking such a review, this court
will not substitute its judgment as between
two reasonably conflicting views, even though
we may have come to a different conclusion
had the case come before us for de novo
review. It is the province of the [agency],
not appellate courts, to resolve conflicting
evidence, and where inconsistent inferences
can be drawn from the same evidence, it is
for the [agency] to draw the inferences.
(Emphasis added.)
Grace Drilling. 776 P.2d at 68 (citations omitted).

Accordingly,

to prevail on appeal Mr. Malquist must somehow demonstrate that
the Commission's medical causation conclusion is not one that a
reasonable mind could have drawn.

Mr. Malquist cannot make this

showing because (1) all credible medical evidence contained in
the record supports the Commission's final order, and (2) even if
there is some minor conflict in the evidence, under Grace
Drilling this Court will defer to the Commission's reasonable
resolution of that conflict.
Administrative Law Judge Moffitt's findings of no
medical causation and lack of credibility are well supported by
the medical evidence and testimony presented at the Industrial
Commission hearing.
As found by Judge Moffitt, Mr. Malquist has had lower
extremity problems since 1960.

(R. 403-07, 442-66.)

In 1962,

Mr. Malquist developed severe vascular problems in his right leg
which continue to contribute to Mr. Malquist's knee condition.
(R. 446-51.)

In 1979, Mr. Malquist worked for the Federal
10

Government on the Minuteman Missile project in Montana.
08.)

(R. 507-

That job involved "cumulative kneeling on . . . cold,

rugged surfaces . . . for over eight months . . . resulting in
laxity of the conjoint tendon." (R. 396.)

Dr. Walker indicated

that the etiologic origin of Mr. Malquist's ongoing knee problem
was the Minuteman Missile job.

(Id.)

On April 16, 1984, Mr. Malquist's treating physician
described severe knee pain due to employment at the Minuteman
Missile project.

(R. 396.)

On April 30, 1984, less than one

year before Mr. Malquist began working for L.K. Comstock, Mr.
Malquist was told to avoid kneeling.

(R. 381.)

On May 14, 1984,

Dr. Walker even prescribed an inversion traction unit for
"therapeutic use in circulatory disturbances of the lower
extremities and also for pain reduction . . . in the knees." (R.
393.)
In April 1985, Mr. Malquist began working for L.K.
Comstock as a welder.

(R. 470)

Knee pads were readily available

to all employees whose jobs required kneeling.
523-24.)

(R. 71, 482, 492,

Despite his long history of prior knee problems, Mr.

Malquist testified under oath that he did not utilize the knee
pads.

(R. 492.)

Further, Mr. Malquist never reported any prior

knee problems to his supervisor.

(R. 480.)

Following the alleged industrial injury Mr. Malquist
was incarcerated at a federal prison in Lampoc, California.
11

(R.

216, 479.)

Medical records from the prison doctor indicate that

Mr. Malquist had no medical complaints during his incarceration
or upon his release from prison.

(R. 367.)

Moreover, Mr.

Malquist signed a statement confirming that fact. (Id.)
After his release from prison Mr. Malquist returned to
Montana and began working for Yellowstone Electric where he
suffered a work-related injury to his arm, low back and shoulder.
(R. 217-18, 500.)

Mr. Malquist was awarded permanent partial and

temporary total disability compensation.

(R. 440.)

Shortly

thereafter, Mr. Malquist commenced a claim against the State of
Montana for his knee condition.

(R. 398.)

Mr. Malquist asserted

that his knee problems were related to the 1979 Minuteman
industrial injury.

(R. 398.)

In an attempt to marshal support

for that claim, Mr. Malquist sent a very damaging letter to his
former treating physician.

He stated:

I have started a claim against the State of
Montana concerning the condition of my knees.
They have deteriorated to the point where I
am in constant pain after doing any kneeling
or squatting and I can no longer work as an
electrician . . . . The origination of this
condition, in my opinion, was when I was
working on the Minuteman Missile project in
Montana in 1979 and I believe I mentioned
that to you at the time I asked you to look
at my knees. If you have that in your file
or you remember that, please include that in
your report.
(R. 398.)

In response, Dr. Walker sent correspondence to Mr.

Malquist dated November 9, 1987:
12

The above patient presented to this office
4/16/84 complaining of moderate to severe
knee pains bilaterally, more pronounced along
the medial collateral ligament areas and
subpatellar, inferior. There was no edema or
rubor present. Ambulation was painful.
The patient had worked for the Federal
Government in 1979, when the condition was
first noticed. (Minute Man Missile project,
Montana.) At that time, he had been on his
knees eight months, and this created laxity
of the conjoint tendon which was present upon
the 4/16/84 examination.
* * *

The diagnosis of 4/16/84 was that of subacute
manifest of chronic bilateral knee strain
(Oria. injury 1979), by painfully limited
ranges of motion and weakness of the medial
collateral and anterior cruciate ligaments.
Etiological origin: post-traumatic cumulative
kneeling on the job, on cold, rugged
surfaces.
(R. 396, emphasis supplied.)
In February of 1988, Mr. Malquist saw Dr. R.A. Sterling
in Missoula, Montana.

At the request of Mr. Malquist's former

attorney, Richard J. Pyfer, Dr. Sterling proffered the following
report which directly conflicts with Mr. Malquist's current
claim:
In addition, and not related to his on-theiob injury, is a knee condition - most
probably chondromalacia of the patella with
intermittent synovitis and hydrarthrosis of
the knee (sometimes called water on the knee
or fluid on the knee).
(R. 263, emphasis supplied.)

13

On February 22, 1989, Mr. Malquist was admitted to St.
Patrick Hospital in Missoula, Montana where a left knee MRI was
performed by Dr. Wiese.

(R. 416.)

The MRI examination found

extensive degenerative disease in Mr. Malquist's knees which is
expected in a middle aged, overweight worker:
I might comment that as patients age, more
and more grade II signal abnormality is seen
within the meniscal substance. This
presumably represents "normal" degenerative
change. I think a 46 y/o patient such as
this, particularly of this patient's size
(270 lbs.) would expect to have a certain
amount of degenerative change in the menisci.
(R. 416.)
After Mr. Malquist presumably failed to obtain
additional benefits in Montana, he filed a claim in Utah.
1.)

(R.

On January 23, 1989, Mr. Malquist's Utah attorney requested

Dr. Sterling to submit a report relating Mr. Malquist's knee
condition to his employment at L.K. Comstock. (R. 277.)

In his

response dated March 2, 1989, Dr. Sterling noted that Mr.
Malquist denied previous injuries to his knees.

(R. 280.)

Despite Mr. Malquist's untruthful denial, Dr. Sterling was unable
to connect Mr. Malquist's knee condition with his employment at
L.K. Comstock:
As regards the knees, his diagnosis would be
chondromalacia of the patella, bilateral,
probable medial and lateral meniscus tears of
the right knee, and possible medial and/or
lateral meniscus tears of the left knee.
•

*

14

*

This long after the fact, it is somewhat
difficult to relate the current condition to
any specific episode or incident in the past.
(R. 281.)

However, giving Mr. Malquist the benefit of the doubt,

Dr. Sterling indicated that "it is not uncommon for a tear to
occur with a squat, such as occurred over a one-month period of
time on the job described in Utah.

One or more tears could have

occurred at that time and persisted to date."
supplied).

(Id.) (emphasis

The foregoing statement from Dr. Sterling is the lone

piece of evidence supporting Mr. Malquist's claim.

However,

because Dr. Sterling's opinion was not stated in terms of
reasonable medical probability, it does not constitute credible
medical evidence.3

Additionally, Dr. Sterling gave the above-

referenced opinion without knowledge of Mr. Malquist's
preexisting knee history.

3

Medical opinions regarding medical causation must be stated
in terms of reasonable medical probability and may not be
speculative or stated in terms of possibility. Vause v. Industrial
CommVn, 407 P.2d 1006, 17 Utah 2d 217 (Utah 1965).
See also
Workers Comp. Fund v. Industrial Comm'n, 761 P.2d 572 (Utah App.
1988); Pittsburgh Testing Laboratory v. Keller. 657 P.2d 1367 (Utah
1983); Pruce v. Fruehauf Corp.. 496 P.2d 712, 27 Utah 2d 370 (Utah
1972); Perchelli v. Utah State Industrial Comm'n. 475 P.2d 835, 25
Utah 2d 56 (Utah 1970).
As in the case at bar, the employee in Vause offered medical
causation testimony to the effect that the industrial exposure
"could have" caused the employee's occupational disease. Vause,
407 P.2d at 1008 (emphasis in original). The Utah Supreme Court
discounted the employee's proffered medical evidence, indicating
that opinions regarding medical causation must be stated in
stronger terms. Id.
15

On October 3, 1989, Mr. Malquist was examined by Dr.
Lionel Weeks at the request of L. K. Comstock and Wausau
Insurance Companies.

(R. 236.)

Mr. Malquist untruthfully stated

that his knee problems began in 1985 when he was working for
L. K. Comstock and overtly omitted all reference to his prior
knee problems while at the Minuteman Missile Project.

(Id.)

Notwithstanding, Dr. Weeks concluded that Mr. Malquist's knee
problems "are primarily degenerative in nature" and that Mr.
Malquist's "kneeling episodes in April and May of 1985. . . are
not the cause of his knee problems."

(R. 237.)

Based upon the foregoing medical evidence, Judge
Moffitt specifically found that Mr. Malquist's testimony was not
credible and that there was no medical connection between his
employment at L.K. Comstock and his current knee condition.

(R.

105-08.)
Thereafter, Mr. Malquist filed a Motion for Review with
the Industrial Commission of Utah.

(R. 89.)

After careful

consideration of the record, the Industrial Commission
unanimously affirmed Administrative Law Judge Moffitt's findings,
stating as follows:
With regard to the Applicant's failure to
establish medical causation, Dr. Weeks
conducted an independent medical evaluation
of the Applicant and his medical records and
Dr. Weeks concluded that the Applicant's knee
problems "are primarily degenerative in
nature" and that the Applicant's "kneeling
episodes in April and May of 1985 . . . are
16

not the cause of his knee problems." . . .
Thus, there is competent medical evidence in
the record to support the administrative law
judge's conclusion that medical causation is
lacking. Lancaster v. Gilbert Development,
736 P.2d 237, 241 (1987) (sic).
The Commission is of the opinion that
the trier of fact is in the best position to
determine issues of credibility. . . . The
Administrative Law Judge had the opportunity
to observe the Applicant during the course of
the hearing and found the Applicant to be
lacking in the requisite credibility. For
example, the Applicant was not candid with
regard to his preexisting injuries. . . . In
a letter to his physician, the Applicant
asked that a letter be submitted to his
Montana Workers' Compensation carrier to the
effect that his knee problems were the result
of his employment on the Minuteman Missile
Project in 1979. Thus, the Administrative
Law Judge's determination that the
Applicant's credibility was lacking is
supported by substantial credible evidence.
(See the Industrial Commission's Order Denying Motion for Review,
attached hereto as Addendum "C")
Mr. Malquist's subsequent request that the Utah Court
of Appeals reverse the Industrial Commission was summarily denied
in a Memorandum Decision issued November 13, 1991.

In that

Decision, the Court concludes that:
. . .this appeal is a "straightforward"
review of the factual determinations by the
Industrial Commission on the issue of
causation of petitioner's knee condition. . .
We affirm the denial of benefits.
A detailed recitation of the facts is
unnecessary. . . .The factual determinations
by the A.L.J, are supported by the
substantial evidence in the record.
17

(See the Utah Court of Appeal's Decision attached as Exhibit
H

C. M )

The Utah Supreme Court should similarly conclude that

there is no basis for reversing the Industrial Commission's
Order.

POINT II
ALLEN DID NOT REQUIRE THAT THE ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW JUDGE SUBMIT THE EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE TO
A MEDICAL PANEL
There is no question that Industrial Commission
administrative law judges function as finders of fact with regard
to the cases they adjudicate.
(1988).

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46(b)-10

As fact finders, administrative law judges are afforded

broad deference by this Court.

Lancaster v. Gilbert Development,

736 P.2d 237, 238-41 (Utah 1987) (It is the responsibility of the
administrative law judge to resolve factual conflicts regarding
medical causation).
As an administrative law judge adjudicates the merits
of any given case, he or she may, in his or her discretion,
utilize a medical panel to assist with the resolution of a
conflict in the medical evidence.

The use of and reliance upon a

medical panel is in no way mandatory.

Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-77

provides that:
. . . Upon the filing of a claim for
compensation for injury by accident . . .
arising out of and in the course of
18

employment . . . the Commission may refer the
medical aspects of the case to a medical
panel appointed by the Commission.
* * *

The Commission may base its finding and
decision on the report of the panel, medical
director, or medical consultants, but is not
bound by the report if other substantial
conflicting evidence in the case supports a
contrary finding. (Emphasis added.)
Mr. Malquist is plainly mistaken when he contends that
Administrative Law Judge Janet Moffitt erred, as a matter of law,
in not submitting the present case to a medical panel.

The

discretion exercised by Judge Moffitt falls well within the
parameters of § 35-1-77.

Indeed, as this Court announced in

Allen v. Industrial Commission. 729 P.2d 15, 24-5 (Utah 1986)
,f

[t]here is no fixed formula by which the causation issue may be

resolved, and the issue must be determined on the facts of each
case."

(Emphasis added.)

Mr. Malquist/s Petition for a Writ of

Certiorari is, therefore, baseless.
CONCLUSION
Administrative Law Judge Janet Moffitt correctly found
that the preponderance of the evidence elicited below does not
support Mr. Malquist's claim for compensation.

The requisite

medical causation linking Mr. Malquist's knee complaints to his
employment with L. K. Comstock does not exist.

That finding of

fact was based upon substantial medical evidence submitted at the
19

hearing below.

The administrative law judge had no obligation to

call upon the services of a medical panel in a case where the
evidence was so singularly one-sided.
Because no credible, conflicting medical evidence
exists, the administrative law judge's medical causation ruling
is beyond reproach.

Even if there is some minor conflict in the

medical evidence, the Commission's factual finding on causation
should be sustained because it is supported by substantial
evidence.
Based upon the administrative law judge's Findings of
Fact and in light of this Court's standard for reviewing such
findings, the final order entered below would be summarily upheld
if the Court were to grant Mr. Malquist's Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari.

Accordingly, the Petition should be denied.

DATED this

Hr

day of February, 1992.
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER
& NELSON

-ma*jtf

{AJJLndf7/\

Michael E. Dyer
Michael A. Peterson
Attorneys for L.K. Comstock
& Company, Inc., and Wausau
Insurance Companies

20

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that four true and correct copies of
the foregoing instrument were mailed, first-class, postage
prepaid, on this ^jday of February, 1992, to the following:
Mr. Erie V. Boorman, Administrator
Employers' Reinsurance Fund
160 East 300 South
P.O. Box 510250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151-0250
Mr. Dale H. Malquist
P.O. Box 633
Lincoln, Montana 59639
Industrial Commission of Utah
160 East 300 South
P.O. Box 510250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151-0250

v^LZ,,

d&?\
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ADDENDUM

A

FILED
NOV 131991
IN THE UTAH _COURT OF APPEALS
——ooOdo
Dale H. Malquist,

Cterkof*>eCcuft
Ufa** Court o*Appeafe

MEMORANDUM "DECISION
(Not F o r P u b l i c a t i o n ]

Petitioner,
C a s e No.

v.
Board of Review of the
Industrial Commission, the
Employers Reinsurance Fund,
L.K. Comstock & Company, and
Employer Mutual Liability,

910181-CA

F I L E D
(November 1 3 , 1991)

Respondents.

Original Proceeding in t h i s

Attorneys:

Court

Dale Malquist, Lincoln, Montana, Petitioner Pro Se
Michael E. Dyer, Brad C. Betebenner, and Michael A.
Peterson, Salt Lake City, for Respondents
Erie V. Boorman, Salt Lake City, for Respondent
Employers Reinsurance Fund

Before Judges Russon, Bench, and Greenwood.
PER CURIAM:
Petitioner seeks review of the denial of workers/
compensation benefits .for knee injuries petitioner allegedly
suffered in 1985. The administrative law judge (A.L.J.) found
insufficient evidence of a medically caused connection between
petitioner's alleged industrial accident in April and May, 1985
and his current knee condition. The Industrial Commission
affirmed the A.L.J., finding "competent medical evidence in the
record to support the . . . conclusion that medical causation is
lacking.11 Petitioner filed a petition for review in this court.
We agree that this appeal is a "straightforward" review of
the factual determinations by the Industrial Commission on the
issue of causation of petitioner's knee condition. We have
reviewed the arguments by petitioner and compared the record
herein with his claim that the findings of the A.L.J, and the
Commission are not supported by substantial evidence. We affirm
the denial of benefits.

A detailed recitation of the facts is unnecessary. We refer
the parties to the A.L.J.'s findings' and the order. The factual
determinations by the A.L.J, are' supported by substantial
evidence in the-record. We adopt herein the conclusions and_
opinion of Jthe Commission in" denying Petitioner's-request for
review. We are not required to accept the selective. f acts__ _
advanced" by Petitioner to support his arguments. - Nor do we adopt
the conclusions
drawn'by
him from those facts. Grace Dri-lling v.
Bd. of Review,.-776 .P. 2d 63 (Utah App~. 1989).
The decision of i:he Commission is supported by substantial
evidence in the record that Petitioner has failed in his burden
to establish a causal connection between his 1985 employment and
his knee injury. A doctor's expressions of possibilities that
petitioner's kneelinq in 1985 "could have" contributed to
petitioner's present physical condition and not that it did so
are, on the whole, insufficient to even present a prima facie
case of causation. Vause v. Industrial Commission, 17 Utah 2d
217, 220, 407 P.2d 1006f 1008 (1965). The evidence does not, in
this case, ensure a medically demonstrable causal link between
petitioner's work activities and his condition. Allen v.
Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15, 27 (Utah 1986).
The order of the Commission is affirmed.

Leonard H. Russon, Judge

Russell,^". Bench, Judge

Pamela T. Greenwood -, Judge

910181-CA
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No. 89000297

DALE H. MALQUIST,
Applicant,
vs.
L. K. COMSTOCK & uun^AWi ana/or
WAUSAU INSURANCE and
EMPLOYERS' REINSURANCE FUND
Defendants.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
* *

FINDINGS OF FACT
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER

HEARING:

Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 160
East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on July 2, 1990,
at 1:00 o'clock p.m..
Said hearing was pursuant to
Order and Notice of the Commission.

BEFORE:

Janet L. Moffitt, Administrative Law Judge.

APPEARANCES:

Applicant was present and represented himself at the
proceedings.
Defendant
employer
and
insurance
carrier
represented by Michael Dyer, Attorney at Law.
The Employers' Reinsurance Fund
Erie V. Boorman, Administrator.

was

represented

The issues to be addressed in this matter are as follows:
1.

Whether
the
applicant,
Dale
Malquist,
sustained
injuries
as
a
result
of
compensable
industrial
accident between April 6, 1985 and May 15, 1985.

2.

Medical causation between
the applicant's
injuries and the employment activities.

3.

Permanent partial impairment
and apportionment
impairment for pre-existing conditions.

4.

Medical expenses.

claimed

of

was

by

DALE MALQUIST
ORDER
PAGE TWO

FINDINGS OF FACT:
The applicant in this matter, Dale H. Malquist, was employed by the
defendants from early April of 1985 through the middle of June, 1985. The
applicant was working as a designated welder on the project and was earning
wages sufficient to entitle him to the maximum in workers compensation
benefits. One of the projects that the applicant was involved in required him
to do welding on a catwalk with a grating. Ke was involved in cutting angle
iron and drilling it for attachment. This involved moving along the grating
on his knees, placing his hand through the rails, grinding off a clean spot
and attaching the angle iron with a U-bolt. He would then move on his knees
approximately seven inches to the next weld spot. The grating, as one would
expect, was ridged with each ridge being approximately two inches apart. It
was the applicant's testimony that approximately two weeks after beginning
work on this job, he began to have swelling and pain in his knees. He first
reported it to his supervisor, Curtis Hunt, approximately four weeks after he
started.
He was directed to go to the site clinic on May 8th, and saw the
medical tech there who gave him some pain medication. No other treatment was
rendered nor were any x-rays taken. It was the applicant's testimony that he
did not wear knee pads throughout this process and was not aware that any were
available.
The applicant was terminated in the middle of May and never got any
treatment for his knees. Instead, he was sent to prison. It was his testimony
that he saw the doctor in prison for his knees although there is no clear
records of that. He was released from prisorr in February of 1987, and began
receiving treatment for an industrial injury for his low back. He has been
treated by Dr. Sterling.
He began treatment of the applicant's knees in
December of 1987, after the applicant had some incidents of pain in his knees
after doing some kneeling and squatting at home. There was no initial mention
to Dr. Sterling of the alleged industrial injury.
Dr. Sterling simply
prescribed anti-inflammatories for the applicant.
For the next three months after his release, the applicant attempted
to do some electrical work in Missoula, Montana.
He stated that he had
difficulty doing this work because of problems with kneeling. Thereafter, he
sustained injuries as the result of an industrial accident to his back and
shoulder and has not worked since. Dr. Sterling has continued to treat the
applicant's knees and has recommended arthroscopic surgery.
The applicant called Curtis Hunt, his former supervisor, to testify
on his behalf.
Mr. Hunt who was very straight forward and credible in his
testimony indicated and confirmed the applicant's length of employment and the
fact that the applicant had worked on some grating. He described the applicant
as a satisfactory worker. He did remember that the applicant had complained
of knee pain when he kneeled. Mr. Hunt testified that knee pads were readily
available to the employees but did not know if the applicant wore knee pads.

DALE MALQUIST
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He described the applicant's actual work activities in a similar manner to the
description given~ by
bhe applicant.
The applicant never ~ informed his
supervisor that he ^ad prior knee problems.
Although the applicant tried to down play knee problems prior to
1985, they have been significant.
The applicant, as early as 1962, had
problems with muscles in his right leg as well as feet problems. In 1970, he
developed a vascular problem in his right leg and was diagnosed as having
vascular disease which contributed to some knee pain. In 1979, the applicant
was working on the Minute Man missile project for an employer and had severe
pain in both knees. At that time, he was diagnosed as having pattelar bursitis
and was told to avoid all kneeling. In 1984, shortly before going to work for
the defendants, the applicant saw a chiropractor, Dr. Walker, for a twisted
knee in California. X-rays were taken of both of his knees at that time and
the applicant was again instructed to avoid kneeling.
On cross-examination, it was also brought out that the applicant, in
addressing the 1985 knee exposure with Dr. Sterling, had never mentioned to
him his two prior major treatments including the treatment of Dr. Walker in
California and the treatment in 1979, where he was diagnosed as having
pattelar bursitis.
The medical records also include a letter from the
applicant dated October 27, 1987, to Dr. Walker in California, concerning a
claim he had made in the state of Montana about the condition of his knees.
At that time, Mr. Malquist asked the doctor to submit information to Montana,
stating that he believed the source of his knee problems to have been his work
on the Minute Man missile project in 1979. In addition to this rather damning
evidence, the applicant also submitted an affidavit of a fellow employee who
had worked with him on the IPP project. Part of the statement that he made
was that during the times that he had workeci on his knees, he had always been
provided with knee protection. It shouLd be noted that he was working on the
same project as the applicant in 1985.
After a review of all of the testimony and medical records in this
matter, the Administrative Law Judge does not believe that the applicant is a
credible witness with regard to the source of his knee problems. While it may
be true that the applicant's problems were briefly aggravated by kneeling, it
is certainly true based on all of the medical records, that there is not a
medical causation between his current need for surgery and the industrial
incidents in 1985.
The applicant has received continuous treatment since
1979, for his knee problems. The only definitive overall report submitted in
this matter was that of Dr. Weeks, who examined the applicant at the request
of the defendants. Even Dr. Weeks was not privy to the information concerning
the applicant's 1979 injuries, and he determined that the needed surgery would
not in any way be related to the applicant's alleged industrial injury in 1985,
but to pre-existing meniscal tears and patello-femoral arthritis. Accordingly,
the Administrative Law Judge is of the opinion that the applicant's claim for
benefits fails both on credibility on testimony of the applicant about problems
he may have brought to the job and by reasons of medical causation.

DALE MALQUIST
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
The applicant in this matter, Dale Malquist, has failed to demonstrate
that there is a medically causal relationship between his industrial activities
in April and May of_ 1985, and his current knee injrury.

ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the claim of Dale H. Malquist, for
benefits arising from an alleged knee injury in April of 1985, be, and the
same is hereby, dismissed.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the foregoing
shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of the date hereof,
specifying in detail the particular errors and objections, and, unless so
filed, this Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal.

(^JfhjSc?? y
/

Passed by the Industrial Commission
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this
t^js
ATTE

t\J

day of August, 1990.

JCp-yh-Jt,

Patricia 0. Ashby
Commission Secretary

Janet L. Mofi^itt
Z
Administrative Law Judge
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OB* UTAH
Case No.

DALE H. HALOUIST
Applicant,
vs.
L.K. COMSTOCK & COMPANY",
EMPLOYER MUTUAL LIABILITY and
EMPLOYERS REINSURANCE FUND,
Defendants.

89000297

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

ORDER DENYING
MOTION FOR REVIEW

*

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
The Industrial Commission of Utah on Motion of the Applicant, Dale
H. Malquist, reviews the Order of the Administrative Law Judge in the
above-entitled matter dated August 31, 1990, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated,
Section 35-1-82.53 and Section 63-46b-12.
On August 31, 1990, an Order was entered by an Administrative Law
Judge of the Commission wherein it was concluded that the Applicant's claim
should be dismissed because of a lack of credibility and a lack of medical
causation.
On October 24, 1990, the Applicant, acting pro se, filed a Motion
for Review alleging that the Administrative Law Judge abused her discretion
in failing to apply the legal standards outlined for cases involving
preexisting injuries in Allen v. Industrial Comm'n, 729 P. 2d 15 (Utah 1986),
in concluding that there was a lack of medical causation evidence in this
case, and in her conclusion that the Applicant was not a credible witness.
Thereafter, the matter was referred to the entire Commission for
review pursuant to Section 35-1-82.53, Utah Code Annotated. The Commission
has reviewed the file in the above-entitled case and the Commission is af the
opinion that the Motion for Review should be denied.
The Commission finds no grounds on which to reverse the decision of
the Administrative Law Judge. The Applicant asserts that the Administrative
Law Judge failed to apply the two prong test for legal and medical causation
which an Applicant must sustain in order to obtain benefits where the case
involves preexisting injuries. This objection is invalid because the alleged
industrial accident occurred between April and June of 1985, long before the
Allen decision by the Utah Supreme Court.

DALE H. MALQU1ST
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The ALJ did not abase her discretion because she applied the
correct standards as they stoodprior to the Allen decision. The_ ALJ's Order
discusses medical causation in-some detail._ Further, even under Allen -the
Applicant's j>bjection^"must fail. "In the event the claimant cannot show a
medical
causal
connection,
compensation
should be
denied." Allen- v.
Industrial Comm'n, 729 P..2d IS (Utah 1986).
In addition, the ALJ made subordinate findings of fact which fully
support her ultimate findings of f_act and' conclusions of law, and thus itr Is
clear she did _not err in applying the appropriate legal standards. Glen ~M.
Barney & Sons v. Industrial Comm'n, 609 P. 2d 948 ("Utah 1980).
With regard to the Applicant's failure to establish medical
causation, Dr. Weeks conducted an independent medical evaluation of the
Applicant
and his medical records and Dr. Weeks concluded that the
Applicant's knee problems "are primarily degenerative in nature" and that the
Applicant's "kneeling episodes in April and May of 1985...are not the cause
of his knee problems." In addition, the Applicant's physician, Dr. Walker,
stated on April 16, 1984 that the etiological origin of the Applicant's knee
problems was "post-traumatic cumulative kneeling on the job, on cold, rugged
surfaces."
Thus, there is competent medical evidence in the record to
support the Administrative Law Judge's conclusion that medical causation is
lacking. Lancaster v. Gilbert Development, 736 P.2d 237, 241 (1987).
The Commission is of the opinion that the trier of fact is in the
best position to determine issues of credibility. This is true primarily
because the trier of fact has the unique opportunity to directly observe the
Applicant and the demeanor of witnesses. The Administrative Law Judge had
the opportunity to observe the Applicant during the course of the hearing and
found the Applicant to be lacking in the requisite credibility. For example,
the Applicant was not candid, with regard to his preexisting injuries. The
Applicant testified under oath that, prior to the alleged injury in 1985 he
had only oae prior incident of right knee pain.
On cross-examination,
medical records were introduced showing that the Applicant had suffered -from
lower extremity cramping, pain and vascular irregularities since, 1962 .Further, the Applicant's testimony regarding the treatment and origin of his
knee injuries contradicted the records of his own physicians. In a letter to
his physician the Applicant asked that a letter be submitted to his Montana
workers' compensation carrier to the effect that his knee problems were the
result of his employment on the Minuteman Missile project in 1979. Thus, the
Administrative Law Judge's
determination that the Applicant's credibility was
lacking is supported by substantial credible evidence.
For the foregoing reasons it is the opinion of the Commission that
the Administrative Law Judge's Order should be affirmed. In affirming, the
Commission adopts the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the
Administrative Law Judge.
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ORDER
PAGE THREE

ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that t,he Order ofL the Administrative Law
Judge of August 31, 1990, is hereby affirmed, and the Motion for Review is
hereby denied.
toy appeal shall be to the Utah Court of Appeals within thirty (30)
days of the date hereof, pursuant to Utah Code .Annotated, Sections
35-1-82.53(2), 35-1-86, and ' 63-46b~16.
Industrial Commission costs to
prepare a transcript of the hearing for appeals purposes shall be borne by
the appellant.

Stephen M. Hadley
Chairman /1

Thomas R. Carlson
Commissioner

Dixie L. Minson
Commissioner

Passed by the Industrial Commission
of Utah. Salt Lake City, Utah, this
/^ Vl)
day of March 1991.
ATTK

^^A^,^)CQ^h^J.
Patricia 0. Ashby
Commission Secretary
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ORDER DENYING
PETITION FOR REHEARING

Dale H. Malquist
Petitioner,

Case No. 910181-CA

v.
Board of Review of the Industrial
Commission, the Employers
Reinsurance Fund, L.K. Comstock
& Company, and Employer Mutual
Liability
Respondents.

THIS MATTER having come before the Court upon petitioner's
Petition for Rehearing, filed November 26, 1991,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petitioner's Petition for
Rehearing is denied.

Dated this

±r - day of December, 1991..

FOR THE COURT:

Mary « J Noonan
Clerk \£f the Court
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Dale H. Malquist
P.O. Box -86LLincolh, MT 59639
October 27, 1987Philip LJ .Walker, D.c.
288 Lewelling-_31vd.
San Lorenzo_,~CA 945a0
Dear Dr. Walker;
I have started a claim against the State of Montana
concerning the condition of my knees. They have deterioated to
the_point where I am in constant pain after doing any kneeling or
squating and I can no" longer work as an electrician. When you
examined and treated them, I believe it was under a workman's
comp claim. The origination of this condition, in my opinion, was
when I was working on the Minuteman Missle Project in Montana in
1979, and I believe I mentioned that to you at the time I asked
you to look at my knees. If you have that in your file or you
remember that, please include that in your report. To have
something done I must establish that the condition resulted from
work performed in Montana.
Additionally, I request records and information to be sent
concerning my knees only.
Sincerely,

Dale H. Malquist
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payment" near the beginning of Subsection
(2)(a)(ii); substituted "an amount" for "a
weekly amount" and "persons" for "person" in
Subsection (2)(b)(ii); and deleted former Subsection (2)(d) providing that if the total award

to dependents did not exceed $30,000, the em
ployer or its insurance carrier was to pay the
difference between the award and $30,000 into
the Employers' Reinsurance Fund.

35-1-69. Payments from Employers' Reinsurance Fund.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
and not an industrial accident,-a claimant is
hot entitled to disability benefits. Large v. Industrial-Comm'n, 758 P.2d 954 (Utah Ct. App.
1988).

ANALYSIS

Apportionment of liability.
—Prerequisite.
Impairment not meeting 10% minimum.
Cited.
-ApportionmenF of liability.
The purpose of this section is to apportion
liability only where an industrial injury measurably contributes to a permanent disability
caused in part by a pre-existing conditio^ not
simply to impose liability on the Employer's
Reinsurance Fund any time a worker's disability is caused by a pre-existing condition. Virgin
v. Board of Review, 803 P.2d 1284 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990).

Impairment not ineeting 10% minimum.
Where claimant's industrially-caused 5% impairment of the back did not meet the 10%
threshold minimum requirement, he- could not
combine the permanent impairment resulting
from separate industrial injuries with the
same employer in order to reach the threshold
necessary for compensation of preexisting conditions, neither caused nor aggravated by any
of the industrial injuries. Otvos v. Industrial
Comm'n, 751 P.2d 263 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).

—Prerequisite.
Entitlement to benefits is a prerequisite to
consideration of apportionment. Where the disability is the result of preexisting conditions

Cited in American Roofing Co. v. Industrial
Comm'n, 752 P.2d 912 (Utah Ct. App. 1988);
Zimmerman v. Industrial Comm'n, 785 P.2d
1127 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

35-1-75. Average weekly wage — Basis of computation.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Hourly employees.
—Minimum hours.
The fact that an employee voluntarily limited his work hours to 13 per week did not
make it unfair to award him compensation
benefits for 20 hours. If the Legislature had
intended to limit an hourly employee to the

actual number of hours he or she worked per
week in calculating the compensation rate, the
Legislature would not have included a statutory minimum of 20 hours in Subsection (l)(e).
American Roofing Co. v. Industrial Comm'n,
752 P.2d 912 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).

35-1-77. Medical panel — Medical director or medical consultants — Discretionary authority of commission to refer case — Findings and reports — Objections to report —- Hearing — Expenses.
(1) (a) Upon the filing of a claim for compensation for injury by accident, or
for death, arising out of and in the course of employment, and if the
employer or its insurance carrier denies liability, the commission may
refer the medical aspects of the case to a medical panel appointed by the
commission.
(b) When a claim for compensation based upon disability or death due
to an occupational disease is filed with the commission, the commission
55

shall, except upon stipulation of all parties, appoint an impartial medical
panel.
(c) A medical panel shall consist of one or more physicians specializing
in the treatment of the disease or condition involved in the claim:
(d) As an alternative method of obtaining an impartial medical evaluation of the medical aspects of a controverted casex the commission in its
sole discretion may employ a medical director or medical consultants on a
full-time or part-time basis for the purpose of evaluating the medical
evidence and advising the commission with jespect to its ultimate factfinding responsibility. If all parties agree to the'use of a medical director
or medical consultants, they-shall be allowed to function in jthe same
manner and under the same procedures as required of a medical panel.
(2) (a) The medical panel, medical director, or medical consultants shall
make such study, take such X rays, and ^perform suctrtests, including
post-mortem examinations if authorized by the commission, as if may
determine to be_ necessary or desirable.
(b) The medical panel, medical .director, or medical consultants shall
make a report in writing to the commission in a form prescribed by the
commission, and also make such additional findings as the commission
may require. In occupational disease cases, the panel shall certify to the
commission the extent, if any, of the disability of the claimant from performing work for remuneration or profit, and whether the sole cause of
the disability or death, in the opinion of the panel, results from the occupational disease and whether any other causes have aggravated, prolonged, accelerated, or in any way contributed to the disability or death,
and if so, the extent in percentage to which the other causes have so
contributed.
(c) The commission shall promptly distribute full copies of the report to
the applicant, the employer, and its insurance carrier by registered mail
with return receipt requested. Within 15 days after the report is deposited
in the United States post office, the applicant, the employer, or its insurance carrier may file with the commission written objections to the report. If no written objections are filed within that period, the report is
considered admitted in evidence.
(d) The commission may base its finding and decision on the report of
the panel, medical director, or medical consultants, but is not bound by
the report if other substantial conflicting evidence in the case supports a
contrary finding.
(e) If objections to the report are filed, the commission may set the case
for hearing to determine the facts and issues involved. At the hearing,
any party so desiring may request the commission to have the chairman
of the medical panel, the medical director, or the medical consultants
present at the hearing for examination and cross-examination. For good
cause shown, the commission may order other members of the panel, with
or without the chairman or the medical director or medical consultants, to
be present at the hearing for examination and cross-examination.
(f) The written report of the panel, medical director, or medical consultants may be received as an exhibit at the hearing, but may not be considered as evidence in the case except as far as it is sustained by the testimony admitted.
56

(g) The expenses of the study and report of the medical panel, medical
director, or medical consultants and the expenses of their appearance
before the commission shall be paid out of the Employers' Reinsurance
Fund.
History: L. 1951, ch. 52, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp.» 42-1-71.10; L. 1955, ch. 57, § 1; 1969,
ch. 86, § 9; 1979, ch. 138, § 6; 1982, ch. 41,
4 1; 1988, ch. 116, § 7; 1991, ch. 136, § 13.
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 199T, substituted the
first "and"jbr "or" in Subsection (l)(a) and de-

leted the former second sentence, -which read
"The panel shall have the qualifications generally applicable to the medical panel under Section 35-2-56", added Subsections (l)(b) and (c)
and redesignated former Subsection (lXblas
(l)(d), and added the second sentence in Subsection (2)(b)

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Referral to panel.

-Effect of 1982 amendment
Referral to panel
Discretion
Cited

—Discretion.
Th e court of appeals cannot say that the administrative law judge abused his discretion in
not referring the case to a medical panel when
there was medical evidence to support his finding of medical causation Workers' Comp Fund
v industrial Comm'n, 761 P 2d 572 (Utah Ct.

Effect of 1982 amendment.
In accord with bound volume See Ortiz v
Industrial Comm'n, 766 P 2d 1092 (Utah Ct
App 1989)
This section is procedural and may be applied to an accident that occurred prior to the
1982 amendments Ortiz v Industrial Comm'n,
101 Utah Adv Rep 60 (Ct App 1989)

App

1988)

Cited in Rekward v Industrial Comm'n, 755
P 2d 166 (Utah Ct App 1988), USX Corp v.
Industrial Comm'n, 781 P 2d 883 (Utah Ct
App 1989)

35-1-78. Continuing jurisdiction of commission to modify
award — Authority to destroy records — Interest
on award — No authority to change statutes of
limitation.
(1) The powers and jurisdiction of the commission over each case shall be
continuing. The commission, after notice and hearing, may from time to time
modify or change its former findings and orders. Records pertaining to cases
that have been closed and inactive for ten years, other than cases of total
permanent disability or cases in which a claim has been filed as in Section
35-1-9&, may be destroyed at the discretion of the commission.
(2) Awards made by the Industrial Commission shall include interest at the
rate of 8% per annum from the date when each benefit payment would have
otherwise become due and payable.
(3) (a) This section may not be interpreted as modifying in any respect the
statutes of limitations contained fn other sections of this chapter or Chapter 2, Title 35, the Utah Occupational Disease Disability Law.
(b) The commission has no power to change the statutes of limitation
referred to in Subsection (a) in any respect.
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 83; C.L. 1917,
§ 3144; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 42-1-72; L. 1961,
ch. 71, § 1; 1963, ch. 49, § 1; 1965, ch. 68, § 1;
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1981, ch. 287, § 5; 1988, ch. 116, § 8; 1990,
ch. 69, § 4.
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend-

